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EDITOR'S NOTE. In this plenary talk given at the annual meeting of the Association for Politics and the Life 
Sciences at Texas Tech University last October, Professor Sophal Ear, then of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate 
School in Monterey, discussed his research on the political economy of emerging infectious disease (EID) 
surveillance programs. His talk reviews lessons learned for U.S. military medical research laboratories 
collaborating with developing countries and is comprised of three case studies: Cambodia (U.S. Naval Area 
Medical Research Unit 2 or NAMRU-2), Indonesia (also NAMRU-2 in the context of H5Nl or Highly 
Pathogenic Avian Influenza), 1 and Mexico (that country's handling of A/HlNl or Swine Flu in 2009).2 
Professor Ear's research provides policymakers with tools for improving the effectiveness of new or existing 
EID surveillance programs. His work also offers host countries the opportunity to incorporate ideas, 
provide opinions, and debate the management of political and economic constraints facing their programs. 
In this analysis, constraints are found for each case study and general recommendations are given for 
improving global emerging infectious disease surveillance across political, economic, and cultural 
dimensions. 
I want to explore with you today emerging infectious disease surveillance programs in the 
context of the politics of influenza in Indonesia, 
Cambodia, and Mexico. But first, just to give you a 
little more context, I want to tell you who I am and 
where I'm coming from with respect to this research. 
Erik's introduction was fabulous. Thank you for that. 
And of course, I want to set it in the context of my two 
books (right, always have to promote the books!): Aid 
Dependence in Cambodia: How Foreign Assistance 
Undermines Democracy3 and The Hungry Dragon: 
How China's Resource Quest Is Reshaping the World4 
(co-authored with Sigfrido Burgos Caceres). Aid 
Dependence in Cambodia is about how foreign aid 
affects tax revenues, namely by lowering them, which 
doi: 10.2990/33_1_69 
then affects accountability and democracy between 
people and their government. The Hungry Dragon 
came out a couple of months after the Cambodia book 
and is about how China is lookng to countries like 
Angola, Brazil, and Cambodia to buy resources but 
also to influence their policies. 
I'm a TED fellow. I've had the opportunity to give a 
TED talk. I'm a Young Global Leader of the World 
Economic Forum and a Term Member of the Council 
on Foreign Relations. I also serve as an Independent 
Trustee of the Nathan Cummings Foundation. But 
more relevant to the Association for Politics and the 
Life Sciences, I am the vice chair of a nonprofit called 
the Diagnostic Microbiology Development Program, 
which last year won a $600,000 contract with the 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) to build 
diagnostic capacity of labs in Cambodia. 
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Gardening as metaphor 
Now a bit about what I do in terms of teaching, I 
teach courses on the political economy of Asia and 
comparative politically economy. So I try to explain 
things like the difference between the haves and have 
nots, why there is inequality, what poverty and 
development mean, and why, frequently, there isn't 
development. And I do that at the U.S. Naval Post-
graduate School in Monterey, California, where my 
students are junior military officers who have often 
been to Iraq and Afghanistan and who are very good at 
breaking things but maybe not so good at rebuilding 
them. So I teach courses on nation-building and post-
conflict reconstruction. And the students often want to 
know the A through Z of how to rebuild a country, 
maybe even get a Nation Building for Dummies book 
(to be fair, I use The Beginner's Guide to Nation-
Building5). But I often have to tell them that it is more 
complicated than that. And though it might seem like a 
nation can be set up from a blueprint where you have an 
architectural plan, and you can design where the rooms 
are, the kitchen, and bathroom, and so on, things 
seldom go according to plan. 
And even if you can map out the counterinsurgency 
dynamics of why the central government of Afghani-
stan doesn't get the support it needs-in this notorious 
"death by PowerPoint slide" that made the rounds a 
few years ago-I think that the work that we do, the 
work that my students are going to end up doing, is 
more like gardening. This metaphor is inspired by the 
work of David Korten and his learning process 
approach. 6 So gardening as metaphor. Why? Because 
gardening is something that locals know best. They 
know the weather conditions. They know the soil 
conditions, and they what grows here what doesn't. 
They know when to prune and when not to prune. It's 
really this illusion of control that I'm trying to take 
away from my students. 
Gardeners have no illusion of control. We create the right 
growing conditions, nurture healthy soil life, set up our 
lifestyle so we have time to tend our crops, and we plant 
a diverse variety of sturdy and healthy plants, and watch 
them grow. We adjust as we go along, removing excess 
weeds, mulching, watering, fertilizing when necessary, 
and picking off pests. Ultimately, the end result almost 
always includes crop failures and unexpected successes. 
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And we feel more like stewards-sometimes even 
observers-than masters of our domain. 7 
So of course I sound like a master gardener but I 
invariably forget to water my plants or I water too 
much, causing death and destruction. So I hope you 
will keep this caveat in mind. 
Previous work 
The research I am going to talk to you about today 
started a few years ago. I consulted with the Institute of 
Development Studies-Sussex to write about the polit-
ical economy of highly pathogenic avian influenza in 
Cambodia. That was because in my doctoral disserta-
tion8 at UC Berkeley I had written about pro-poor 
livestock policy in Cambodia and, as a result, had to 
look at H5N1 when it arrived there in 2003. That led 
to work that was published by Politics and the Life 
Sciences on the political economy of disease control in 
Cambodia,9 which eventually resulted in DTRA 
becoming interested in giving me a grant to look at 
U.S. Navy and Army labs around the world. There are 
these labs all over the world that are owned by the U.S. 
military and they are supposed to do research to stop, 
or to prevent essentially, mission failure by our armed 
services in terms of our ability to go to different 
countries, in different parts of the world, by minimiz-
ing the risk that some disease is going to prevent them 
from completing their mission. 
So these labs are doing critical work in terms of 
testing samples that come through, in terms of 
publishing papers, and creating vaccine products. But 
they aren't always welcome, and one of the reasons for 
my research was that one lab in particular in Indonesia 
was kicked out of the country. The results I'll talk 
about come from a paper that was subsequently 
published in Asian Security comparing Indonesia and 
Cambodia's experience with the U.S. Naval Area 
Medical Research Unit 2 (NAMRU-2). 10 How many 
of you have heard of NAMRU-2-nobody? Well, 
NAMRU-2 became quite famous a few years ago for 
what happened to them in Indonesia. And then, 
subsequently, DTRA commissioned me to do research 
on the politics of A/H1N1 in Mexico and Mexico's 
reaction to a disease that-based on available evi-
dence-could possibly kill millions of people. If Al 
H1N1 had the mortality rate of H5N1 (over 50 
percent), for example, it could have cost a lot of lives. 
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And of course, DTRA needed to know how to handle 
an outbreak like this in the future. Work since then has 
taken me to Kenya, Peru, and Thailand, as well as the 
U.S.-Mexico border, to look at more military labs and a 
civilian program called Early Warning Infectious 
Disease Surveillance. 11 
In the next set of papers I talk about, I look at 
politics, economics, and culture. I know that if Gad 
were here-not God, but Gad Saad12-he would 
probably object to the word culture, but it is true that 
culture matters in terms of how one does surveillance 
in a given country, how people react when asked to 
contribute blood samples, for example, and how belief 
systems can determine outcomes (the Caduceus, or 
snake, symbol of medicine is seen as sorcery in some 
rural parts of Kenya, for example). This leads me to the 
question of why some countries report disease out-
breaks while others do not. How can countries be 
incentivized to perform surveillance and report disease 
outbreaks? The problem, essentially, is that countries 
are sovereign and they don't have to report if they don't 
want to. If they are part of the World Health 
Organization, they've signed up to international 
obligations like the International Health Regulations. 
But while in theory they should abide by them, if they 
don't, what's going to happen to them? If nothing 
serious is going to happen, they can get away with 
essentially not reporting outbreaks. 
To give you a sense of my methodological approach, 
I conduct comparative case studies. I use elite surveys, 
semi-structured interviews, and content analysis of 
interview transcripts. In this presentation, I will first 
frame the problems that are present in resource-poor 
environments. I next examine Indonesia, Cambodia, 
and Mexico as comparative cases, then wrap up with 
some concluding thoughts. 
The problem of patchy surveillance 
Among the myriad problems for disease surveillance, 
and in particular emerging infectious disease surveil-
lance, one that stands out is poor-to-nonexistent 
disease surveillance in a lot of these countries. You've 
got poor diagnostic lab capacity in these countries 
combined with a disincentive to report because if you 
report a problem, tourists are not going to come to 
your country, which means you'll lose money-and in 
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the end, so much of this is about money. Adding insult 
to injury, you will have to do things to your people for 
which you will be punished at the ballot box-like 
killing their chickens to control the disease. And then 
there's this problem of viral sovereignty, one that 
emerged in Indonesia. According to a report from the 
Institute of Medicine: 
In 2006, Indonesia claimed "viral sovereignty" over 
samples of H5Nl collected within its borders and 
announced that it would not share them until the WHO 
and developed countries established an equitable means 
of sharing the benefits (e.g., vaccines) that could derive 
from such viruses (p. 213).13 
Okay, so viral sovereignty was invoked by Indonesia 
in 2006 when the country claimed that samples of 
viruses found within its borders were essentially its 
intellectual property. Viral samples are just like finding 
an animal or a plant particular to Indonesia, and 
therefore you couldn't just take it out. You had to ask 
for permission and, if permission was not granted, you 
could not remove the sample. This was seen as a real 
global health threat. The late Richard Holbrooke 
coauthored an op/ed in the Washington Post saying 
that Indonesia was risking global health by not sharing 
samples because if an outbreak were to start there, and 
certainly H5Nl was a problem at that time, the disease 
could spread to the rest of the world and by the time 
you figured things out you might have a pandemic on 
your hands and no vaccine produced as a result. 14 
All this is also happening at a time when these poor 
countries are spending a fraction, a very small fraction, 
of what rich countries are spending on healthcare. In 
2001, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) 
reported that, in the poorest countries "per capita 
expenditure on all aspects of health care [is] 3 percent 
that of expenditures in high-income countries" and that 
medical staff in over 90 percent of these countries are 
"not familiar with quality assurance principles ... more 
than 60 percent of laboratory equipment is outdated or 
f . . ,, ( 3) 15 not unct10nmg p. . 
I wanted to see if it was still the case 10 years later, so 
I asked an expert who worked for the CDC and now is 
based at a major U.S. university. He said that from his 
experiences in countries in Central Asia, Southeast 
Asia, India, and Sub-Saharan Africa he thought the 
status had not changed much from the time of the 
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GAO report. 16 So, it's really a situation where we have 
very poor health infrastructure, inadequate healthcare 
facilities, and disease outbreaks happening. 
To give you historical context from the last century 
and the number of outbreaks that have taken place, the 
first one is the 1918 Spanish Flu, and I should say that 
the first slide that I showed for my presentation is from 
the Spanish Flu episode. Does anybody know why it 
was called Spanish flu? [Audience member answers 
correctly that it was because Spain was a neutral 
country during World War I, censors allowed stories of 
influenza to be published about Spain while early 
reports of illness and mortality in Germany, Britain, 
France, and the United States were censored.] Exactly, 
so the newspapers write about it, and Spain gets credit 
for being the origin of this horrible new disease. 
Every century you've got outbreaks of deadly 
diseases, but at the pandemic level what you see are 
about two to three pandemics per century. Already we 
have seen the first pandemic of the 21st century in the 
form of A/HlNl, first dubbed Swine Flu. So that turns 
out to be, of course, one of several we can expect in the 
coming decades. The downside of globalization is that 
diseases can hop on planes and travel anywhere a 
passenger will travel to. And what you see from this 
map here of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) in 2002-2003 is an idea of where SARS 
started-at the Metropole Hotel in Hong Kong-and 
then how it infected China and other nearby countries. 
But surprisingly enough, the second most affected 
country is Canada because many Hong Kongers 
obtained Canadian nationality before the 1997 hand-
over and continued to maintain very close ties in cities 
like Vancouver and Toronto. They travel to Toronto as 
well as the United States in the third category here. 
So what kinds of diseases are we talking about now 
in terms of emerging diseases? I've talked about SARS, 
I've talked about H5N1 already. You've heard of West 
Nile, I'm sure. And certainly there's A/HlNl, Ebola in 
Africa, and the Nipah and Hendra viruses. The spread 
of Chikungunya, a mosquito-borne disease common in 
Africa and Asia, in the Eastern Caribbean has been 
alarming. 17 At the same time that diseases are 
spreading, emerging, and re-emerging if you look at a 
map of healthcare around the world, you see immedi-
ately that the parts of the world that have unsuitable 
healthcare are much of Africa and parts of Asia-
places where disease outbreaks could happen and 
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Table 1. Key issues identified by interview subjects in 
Indonesia 
Issue 
Poor host-donor relationship 
Differing host and donor priorities 
Low salaries 
Decline in Ministry of Health quality 
NAMRU-2 is misunderstood 
Poor compensation for culling 
Local levels don't see reporting 
translated into response 
Respondents referring to issue* 
13 of 26 (50 percent) 
8 of 26 (31 percent) 
7 of 26 (27 percent) 
6 of 26 (23 percent) 
6 of 26 (23 percent) 
4 of 26 (15 percent) 
4 of 26 (15 percent) 
Note: Content analysis was performed on interview notes and tagged for 
key themes; these tags were then analyzed for frequency. 
*By proportion of interview sessions. 
spread. The other problem is that a disease like 
H5N1 happens in the context of countries where 
poultry and humans live in close proximity. So, it's 
going to be very likely that if the virus originates from 
somewhere with a long history of raising poultry in 
close quarters, it's going to be very difficult to separate 
people from this important food source, given that 
there's a long tradition of essentially having backyard 
poultry and keeping it there as a sort of small change 
savings account, while the cow is your marriage and 
funeral major expense. 
The case of Indonesia · 
Let me talk about Indonesia as a case study. 
Indonesia was the country that after four decades of 
hosting the U.S. Naval Area Research Unit 2 suddenly 
kicked them out, essentially refusing to renew the visas 
of the American military officials who worked there. I 
interviewed NAMRU-2's commanding officer, a U.S. 
Navy captain, and I asked him why he thought 
NAMRU-2 was getting the boot. He pointed to 
Indonesia's Minister of Health, Siti Fadilah Supari, 
who in the narrative of the commanding officer's story 
was after NAMRU-2 and wanted the research unit 
gone. Supari had conspiracy theories that NAMRU-2 
was doing bioweapons research and testing American 
vaccines on Indonesians and Muslim children the 
world over, which she expounded about in her book, 
It's Time for the World to Change: In the Spirit of 
Dignity, Equity, and Transparency: Divine Hand 
Behind Avian Influenza. 18 Unfortunately for research, 
this played into the "global war on terror" crusade 
narrative. It was definitely true that she had something 
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to do with it, but what I discovered in interviewing 
additional informants was that perhaps there was more 
to it than just one person going after a lab. As shown in 
Table 1, there were several reasons why the Naval Area 
Research Unit in Indonesia, and this lab in particular, 
was having issues. 
The first reason, of course, is a poor host-donor 
relationship, which definitely soured relations between 
the Minister of Health and NAMRU-2. But then you 
also had things like differing host and donor priorities. 
So maybe NAMRU-2's goal had been increasingly to 
publish research papers, and Indonesia's goal was 
actually to find products (cures) that could help its 
citizens improve their lives, not necessarily NAMRU-
2's mission. As well, the compensation of Ministry of 
Health staff in Indonesia had stagnated, and as with 
most developing countries, the quality of the Ministry 
of Health staff itself was low. Of course, NAMRU-2 
could be misunderstood in terms of its benefits and 
contributions to Indonesia and that was certainly the 
case. And, in Indonesia the problem with controlling a 
disease like H5Nl is that you've got to kill the birds, 
you've got to cull the poultry within a certain radius, 
and if you are not compensating people or inadequate-
ly compensating them, or taking too long to compen-
sate them, you are making it impossible for them to 
report outbreaks because when they call you, you are 
going to come and destroy their livelihoods. So that's 
definitely a problem, and it's something that we will see 
again in the case of Cambodia. 
And finally, if the locals don't see the results 
translated into benefits fast enough, that becomes a 
major problem. If a local doctor has a patient who has a 
mystery disease and the sample, let's say, gets sent to 
NAMRU-2, there's not necessarily a call back from 
NAMRU-2 that says, "Hey this is actually what you 
have." NAMRU-2 is not there for diagnosis and 
treatment. They do testing, but they are not there to 
do diagnostic testing for individuals. And actually, since 
we're here at Texas Tech, in a university environment, 
the mission of NAMRU-2 isn't that different from the 
university's mission: you've really got to publish or 
perish and that is ·driving scientific personnel's incen-
tives. One of NAMRU-2's goals was to produce 
publications, when perhaps the Indonesians were not 
as interested in that. 
In fact, one narrative I heard was that the kind of 
American scientists who came to NAMRU-2 to work 
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Donor dependence culture 
Poor staff management/HR 
Patronage networks 
No compensation for culling 
Differing host and donor priorities 
Respondents referring to issue* 
5 of 12 (42 percent) 
5 of 12 (42 percent) 
4 of 12 (33 percent) 
4 of 12 (33 percent) 
4 of 12 (33 percent) 
3 of 12 (25 percent) 
Note: Content analysis was performed on interview notes and tagged for 
key themes; these tags were then analyzed for frequency. 
*By proportion of interview sessions. 
had changed over time. When NAMRU-2 started, four 
decades earlier, there were senior scientists who came 
to NAMRU-2 and they maybe were no longer in a 
publish-or-perish phase of their professional lives 
where they needed to publish as much as possible. 
They were there to provide advice. More recently, in 
the last decade, the types of officials who came were 
younger scientists who needed to burnish their 
credentials, and so the drive to publish was much 
stronger. Compensation for culling poultry in Indone-
sia was not rejected as a policy, as happened in 
Cambodia, but it was dysfunctional at best, so much so 
that the World Bank project's compensation mecha-
nism failed to disburse on time or altogether. 
The case of Cambodia 
Let me turn to the case of Cambodia and start off 
with this image here of the first, well actually he is the 
ninth victim of H5Nl, but the first to actually survive. 
And he was found because of sentinel testing done by 
NAMRU-2 in Cambodia. He walked into a hospital 
feeling ill, gave a sample of his blood, probably got a 
bag of noodles as compensation for that, and two 
weeks later was somehow found because they tested 
the blood and discovered that this guy had H5Nl. Well 
the next person after him also survived, thanks to the 
fact that NAMRU-2 also found him. What are the odds 
of that? The first person, the first human victim of 
H5Nl, officially, in Cambodia is actually not even 
found in Cambodia-she's found in Vietnam, where a 
hospital there was taking care of her. And she died 
there. They tested her and discovered that she had 
H5Nl. 
So the narrative is one of "look at how a country like 
Cambodia with its poor health infrastructure, with its 
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terrible healthcare system, look at how it can't even 
find its own victims. You have to stumble across the 
border and die for somebody else to find you!" And, I 
should add, her brother actually died before her and 
was cremated, so he might have been the first victim. 
For surveillance to work requires that essentially one 
detect the first case, i.e., to find the canary in the 
coalmine. So the canary discovers leaking gas and dies. 
In this case if you want surveillance to work you've got 
to find the animals before the humans die. And in this 
map of Cambodia showing the animal outbreaks for 
the period of 2004-2008, if you look at where the dots 
are-and I'm going to now switch over to the human 
victims-what you see is, more or less, an overlay of 
human victims and animals. Except that, of course, it 
was the human victims that were found first, and then 
the culling of poultry began around where the human 
victims lived. So it's totally the reverse-humans are 
the canaries-which isn't useful, obviously, for the 
purpose of surveillance. 
As shown in Table 2, the types of issues that were 
raised in Cambodia were somewhat similar to Indo-
nesia but the priorities were different. 
The top issue raised in Cambodia was low staff 
compensation, which has always been a problem in 
Cambodia. The level of compensation for the Ministry 
of Health is abhorrent really-$50 a month in pay. In 
terms of donor dependence, that's something I write 
about in my Aid Dependence in Cambodia book.19 It's 
really this idea that donors are calling the shots. The 
host country, Cambodia, is more or less going along 
and when the money runs out, they stop doing 
whatever it is the donors want. So, there's really no 
buy-in or ownership from that standpoint. Again, we 
see poor staff management and human resources issues 
cited; that's pretty typical in a poor country. Patronage 
networks on the basis of patron-client relations are also 
very common. And, certainly in Cambodia as opposed 
to Indonesia-which saw at least some willingness to 
compensate, even though much of the money the 
World Bank had allocated was never spent-there was 
no compensation at all for culling. 
So there was no desire at all from the government. I 
suspect that the reason for why Cambodia's govern-
ment did not allow compensation was to avoid setting 
a precedent. If you get money for something that 
happens to your poultry, people would then expect that 
if the government takes away my land, I would expect 
Ear 
to be compensated for that, too. So, you don't want to 
start down that road, especially when you already have 
bad governance. And there were certainly some 
differing host and donor priorities, in terms of goals 
of the donors and goals of the country itself. For one, it 
was clear that donor countries wanted to reduce the 
pandemic potential of the disease reaching their own 
borders. 
So how to make sure that a disease discovered in 
another country, in a poor country, could be stopped 
there before it got on a plane and reached a donor 
country? That's a valid goal, but foreign aid isn't only 
about, or at least shouldn't only be about, protecting 
and aiding donor countries. Even so, a lot of foreign aid 
is designed to support donor countries by forcing the 
host or receiving country to say, buy American, fly 
American, and do all kinds of things that bring the 
money back. This is called "tied-aid." In the mid-1990s, 
USAID's administrator testified before Congress, saying 
proudly that 84 cents of every dollar of foreign aid now 
returns to the U.S. That's not necessarily something you 
want to brag about to the receiving countries, even if it 
does play well in Congress. 
In terms of patronage, if you can imagine a 
constellation of Cambodia's political elite, imagine 
that they are all tied-together-literally, as in-laws-
because they are almost invariably married to one 
another through complex networks of trust and 
commitment (see Figure 1). I know it looks very 
complicated. You don't have to worry about anything 
except the fact that in the middle is the prime minister; 
and all the orange and yellow are his in-laws who run 
different parts of the government, and their kids of 
course. There's very little political instability as a result 
of that but as well there are going to be highly vested 
interests. A lot of these people own hotels. A lot of 
these people are engaged in tourism. Their interests are 
to keep things quiet in terms of infectious disease 
outbreaks. 
Here's a photo of the Prime Minister casting his 
ballot in 2008. I only show this because for the entire 
year before the July 2008 election, there was not one 
outbreak of H5Nl reported. Meanwhile, all around 
Cambodia-in Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos-there 
were reported outbreaks. Yet in Cambodia for some 
reason, the virus knows to stay out of Cambodian 
politics. That's telling. Of course, there were rumors 
that tests of poultry came up positive for H5Nl but the 
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Figure 1. Intermarriages and intersecting political spheres in Cambodia. Reprinted with permission, Phnom Penh 
Post. 
results were suppressed. The reason is simple: they 
were not culling poultry and offering compensation. 
They didn't want to go out there and damage potential 
votes by destroying their property. So the solution is 
just don't report. Or, if you do find positive results, 
don't say they are positive. That way you don't have to 
go and destroy people's property and suffer their wrath 
at the ballot box. 
I mentioned tourism: 14 percent of Cambodia's 
economy is based on tourism. This dependence 
provides an incentive not to report on disease 
outbreaks that generate the kind of publicity that 
prevents people from visiting because they're afraid of 
what might be happening there. The compensation for 
culling remains a fraught issue. As of October 17, 
2013, a few days ago, there have been 21 cases of 
H5Nl in humans in Cambodia for the year. That's 
equal to the total number of cases prior to 2013. So 
there's been an acceleration of cases just this year. Of 
the 42 cases overall that have been confirmed, 31 were 
children under the age of 14, and 25 were women. Just 
10 out of the 21 cases reported this year have survived. 
If you are looking at that kind of mortality rate, it's 
obviously over 50 percent. 
The kinds of communication campaigns that donors 
engaged in were simple messages about behavior 
change. In Cambodia, the Ministry of Health, the 
UN, and the Australian Agency for International 
Development are sponsoring messages about washing 
your hands, cooking your food properly, latrine use, 
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using, I guess, tissue when you blow your nose, and not 
handling dead poultry (although it looks like it's saying 
handle dead poultry, unless you can read Khmer!). The 
message here is pretty clear: Don't touch dead birds. 
The interesting thing is after these types of campaigns, 
people's awareness of how to handle poultry improves. 
If you ask them, they know they should wash their 
hands, they know they should do this or that. The 
problem, however, is they don't do it. The reason is 
that telling them to do it isn't going to make a 
difference unless you make it easier for them, that is, if 
you incentivize them-if you make it economically 
viable for them to undertake sanitary practices. 
There were other wacky ideas including Super 
Chicken, for example, a superhero character intended 
to promote education among farmers about handling 
chickens. One bit of advice is to quarantine new 
poultry when you introduce it to your flock-quaran-
tine it for 10 days before allowing new and old poultry 
to mingle together. But this is a very expensive and 
time-consuming practice and the $30 million that was 
allocated to Cambodia through various publicity 
campaigns, behavior change campaigns, and donations 
of personal protective equipment did not include any 
money to actually change people's incentives. There is 
still no compensation for culling poultry in Cambodia. 
The case of Mexico 
Let me now move to the third and final case, that of 
Mexico and that country's experience with A/H1N1. I 
want to set the scene here: it's early on in the outbreak 
in Mexico and at the presidential palace, the president 
of Mexico-Felipe Calderon, at the time-had to 
decide whether essentially to go China's way or 
Canada's way in terms of reporting this outbreak of a 
new disease. Now, thank goodness for the world he 
chose the transparent Canadian approach to reporting 
as opposed to suppression of information as China did 
in the case of SARS. But the actual hero of the story it 
also turns out is Canada, because at various points in 
the story, it's Canada that turns out to save the day. 
When the disease was identified, samples of the new 
virus were sent to both the U.S. and Canada, and even 
though the U.S. should have gotten it first, it was 
stopped by U.S. Customs and Border Protection for 
fear of introducing some sort of unknown biological 
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agent into the U.S. It's the Canadians who, from a 
phone call alone, were able to arrange for a Mexican 
military plane to land in Canada and drop off a sample 
there the next day. So the testing then ends up being 
done by the Canadians before the U.S. could even get 
its act together. The A/H1N1 vaccine that was 
produced, if you'll remember, actually took a lot more 
resources and required a longer production time than 
was first anticipated. So when the Mexicans asked the 
U.S. Ambassador to Mexico for 2,000 doses of 
vaccines for their health workers, the ambassador 
knew, even then, that it was unlikely that we could 
actually fill that request. Hopefully, this did not happen 
when Wall Street bankers were discovered to have 
appropriated the A/H1N1 vaccine for themselves, 
ahead of other high-risk populations. 20 
Ultimately, it was the Canadians who ended up 
giving Mexico the requested doses. In terms of 
economic impact, I don't have to tell you, the Great 
Recession happened at the same time. So in 2009, 
Mexico experienced a 6.5 percent drop in GDP. But 
one percentage point of that was a result of A/H1N1, 
which is more than 15 percent of the 6.5 percent drop 
in GDP. And with an economy of 1.8 trillion dollars, 
that's at least 18.3 billion dollars, which is far more 
than anything Mexico could have hoped to get from 
the international community in terms of compensation 
to ease the pain. So if Mexico was thinking that by 
reporting this disease there would be this pot of gold 
that would be a kind of reward for the country later on 
to, you know, sustain less damage to its economy, the 
most that it got from the World Bank on healthcare 
was a couple hundred million dollars, which is far less 
than the losses it suffered from the social distancing 
practices that were imposed in Mexico City. 
In terms of how the Minister of Health of Mexico 
handled the outbreak, in this comic strip here, on 
television the Minister of Health makes a statement 
that, "Of the 159 deaths, 26 have been proven to have 
the virus and 7 are confirmed," and an onlooker says 
"Seems like the virus first attacks the capacity to do 
math." So there's certainly, I think, a risk in being 
transparent and in making statements as soon as you 
are able to share some information with the world: the 
problem involves making mistakes and looking like a 
fool. Obviously, there will be situations where infor-
mation isn't as accurate perhaps as it ought to be. 
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There will be a trade-off between expediency and 
accuracy. 
Conclusion 
I'll close now by going back to the cases of Indonesia 
and Cambodia and just share with you an email I got 
from a senior Indonesian scientist around the time of 
NAMRU-2's closure. He writes (or she, I'm not sure): 
"Namru-2 Jakarta is shutting down. I have been very 
sad. Not only because I am losing my job, but more 
than that, Indonesia will loss [sic] an established 
laboratory research coz [sic] of political reasons."21 
And this is really the takeaway message that I have 
for the military and for anybody doing work in this 
area. Technology and financial resources are great, but 
technology and money alone are not going to be 
enough to prevent a diplomatic incident, or to fend off 
political problems. Churchill had a famous quote about 
this. He said, "Scientists should be on tap, but not on 
top." By this he meant, essentially, that scientists could 
perhaps advise politicians about how to undertake 
policies that would benefit the public, but they're not 
politicians. They are not the elected officials. All they 
can do is simply give advice and let the politicians 
decide. 
So as not to offend the scientists among us, I have 
changed that to: "Technology should be on tap, but not 
on top." But more seriously, it is a critique of our 
overreliance on technology to avoid doing the really 
hard work of building laboratory capacity on the 
ground, not only for the 18 or so bioterrorism agents/ 
diseases that interest us in the industrialized world but 
the deadly diseases that afflict our partner nations. 
Another quote from Churchill: "Now this is not the 
end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, 
perhaps, the end of the beginning." For NAMRU-2, 
certainly, the expulsion from Indonesia was sort of an 
end-beginning situation. The commanding officer of 
NAMRU-2 in Jakarta ended up leaving because his 
visa was not renewed. Hopefully, NAMRU-2 will 
realize that the relationship between itself and the host 
country in which it operates needs to be far more 
finessed than it has been in the past. NAMRU-2 
headquarters moved to Hawaii after Indonesia and has 
now moved to Singapore. Let's hope in Singapore it 
will have a better relationship. But in Singapore you're 
dealing with a place that doesn't have the kinds of 
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diseases that Indonesia or another poor country would 
have. That's a loss, I think, for our ability to do sentinel 
studies and surveillance of diseases where the rubber 
meets the road. 
Thank you very much. 
Note 
I want to thank Erik Bucy and the journal's transcribers for 
doing the heavy lifting of putting my spoken words (often 
nonsensical) into a coherent transcript. All errors remain my 
own. The views expressed in this article are those of the 
author and do not represent the views of the U.S. Navy or 
U.S. government. 
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